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NOTES

Emerging Leader of the Tax

Avant-Garde: Poland's Proposal
to Institute a Flat Tax on Individual
and Corporate Incomes
ABSTRACT

In 1998, Poland's Minister of Finance Leszek
Balcerowicz unveiled a plan to restructure the tax system.
His fiat tax proposal promises numerous benefits to
individual and corporate taxpayers with significant reduction
in tax ratesfor both groups. The new plan offers to further
strengthenPoland'sgrowing economy-a consequence that is
especially significant in light of the country's aspiration to
join the European Union. It provides a remedy for virtually
every ailment plaguing the current tax system and, most
importantly, the reform offers to finance itself This Note
argues that the plan should be adopted immediately for the
following reasons: (1) Poland's weak middle class is not
likely to oppose it; (2) the danger of harmful consequences to
those who rely on the current tax laws is minimal at best;
and (3) the reform will send a positive message to the citizens
about the country's well-being ten years after its transitionto
a free-market economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Last year marked the tenth anniversary of Poland's first free
parliamentary election since World War II. 1 Today, Poland's
economic growth is the fastest in Eastern Europe, inflation is2
substantially limited and the investment spending is strong.
Two-thirds of all jobs are now in the private sector and real wages
A recent assessment by the International
are on the rise.3
Monetary Fund characterized Poland's transition to the free
market economy as "firmly on track."4 It commended Poland for
"its continued record of impressive economic performance, as
reflected in the achievement of sustained strong economic growth
s
with attendant gains in living standards."
Credit for this continued achievement is largely due to one
As
man-Poland's Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz.
Deputy Prime Minister in Poland's first democratically elected
government, Balcerowicz delineated the course for Poland's
6
transition from a centralized economy to a free-market economy.
His scheme, known as -the Balcerowicz Plan, provided for rapid
decentralization, elimination of price controls, and rationing of
consumer goods. 7 He pushed for speedy privatization of large,
state-owned enterprises 8 that, until 1989, had been operated as
Balcerowicz reformed the
centrally controlled monopolies. 9
banking system and pushed for creating mechanisms for
He was instrumental in
channeling private investments. 10
creating the Warsaw Stock Exchange and revising Poland's tax
laws."
Due to his reforms, the Polish, trained by the former
regime to refrain from making independent economic choices,
have increasingly gained confidence in the new free-market

See Howard A. Wolf-Rodda, Note, The Support for Eastern European
1.
Democracy Act of 1989: A Descriptionand Assessment of Its Responsiveness to the
Needs of Poland, 17 MD. J. INTL L. & TRADE 107, 117 (1993).
2.
See IMF Annual Assessment of Poland's Economy, 8 BNA's E. EUR. REP.
310 (April 20, 1998) [hereinafter IMFAssessment] (the article contains the full text
of the International Monetary Fund press information notice released March 30,
1998 at the conclusion of the Fund's annual consultation with Poland).

3.
4.
5.

See id.
Id.
Id.

See Wolf-Rodda, supra note 1, at 118-19.
6.
government was led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
See id. at 118-19.
7.

8.

See id.

9.
10.

See id. at 117.
See id. at 119.

11.

See id.

The newly formed
See id. at 118.
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environment and regained their entrepreneurial spirits, providing
fuel for economic growth.
Balcerowicz has been in and out of his office in the Ministry
of Finance during the past decade, but today the veteran is back
in the Cabinet with a new vision. In 1998, he unveiled his
proposal to reform Poland's fiscal scheme and to institute a flatrate tax on all corporate and individual incomes.' 2 Balcerowicz
promised greater economic growth, across the board fiscal
fairness, and greater administrative efficiency.' 3 He asked for
nothing in return but a little trust from the Polish. By virtue of
Balcerowicz's excellent track record and the shear attractiveness
of his proposal, this trust is amply merited.

II. THE FLAT TAX AS A CONCEPT
Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman first introduced
the flat tax in 1962.14 Since then, legal scholars, economists, and
politicians around the world have embraced the idea. While
many variations exist on Friedman's theme, the basic concept
behind the flat tax is simple: substantial broadening of the
5
taxable base accompanied by a reduction of marginal rates.'
Broadening the taxable base is accomplished by methodically6
eliminating exclusions, deductions and various tax credits.'
Once the base has been broadened, the rates are converged and
lowered to generate the same amount of tax revenues as would
have been produced with the narrow-base-high-progressive-rates
7
scheme.1
In practice, the flat tax is not quite flat. Most of today's flat
tax proposals involve a progressive scheme of taxation where
income, up to a certain amount, is not subject to withholding.' 8
12.
See generally Switch to Flat Personal Income Tax Rate Proposed by
Finance Minister Balcerowicz, 8 BNA's E. EUR. REP. 547 (July 27, 1998)
(discussing reaction to Balcerowicz's proposal to adopt a flat rate for personal
income tax, at either 17 or 18 percent, to be implemented by the year 2000).
13.
See MINISTERSTWO
FINANSOW,
BIALA KsIEGA PODATKOW:
ANALIYA
OBECNEGO SYSTEMU PODATKOWEGO, PROPOZYCTE ZMIAN [MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE
WHITE BOOK OF TAX: ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING TAX SYSTEM, PROPOSED CHANGES] 61

(1998) [hereinafter THE WHITE BOOK].
14.
See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 174-76 (1st
ed. 1962) (discussing 23.5% flat tax in relation to the justifications for graduated
taxation and the redistribution of income).
15.

See Michael J. Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First

Step in the Transitionto a "Flat-Rate"Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983).

16.

See id.

17.

See id.

18.
See Richard P. Davies, Note, A Flat Tax Without Bumpy Philanthropy:
Decreasing the Impact of a "Low, Single Rate" on Individual Charitable
Contributions,70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1749, 1780 (1997).
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19
Thus, individuals in the initial bracket are taxed at a zero rate.
The government taxes all others at a single rate on the excess of
their income over the generous tax-free amount.2 0 At least two
economists, Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, authors of the
proposed reform of the U.S. income tax system, advocate this
21
particular approach.
Supporters of flat rate taxation cite a number of inherent
First, a flat tax would serve as an
benefits of the system.
incentive for individuals to work by increasing the amount of
post-withholding disposable income that, in turn, would raise the
22
"total output," thereby improving economic performance.
Secondly, broadening the tax base would promote neutrality of
the taxing scheme, which would reduce the impact of fiscal

regulation on the allocation of resources and eliminate existing
disincentives to engage in certain types of economic activity. 23 A
broad tax base would also mean horizontal equity, a concept
requiring that all persons in similar circumstances should pay
the same amount of tax.2 4 Most importantly, a flat tax fosters
simplicity. 25 In their proposal, Hall and Rabushka predict a
"postcard" would be a sufficient replacement for "the many pages
26
of schedules the typical [American] taxpayer fills out today."
27
Though not without inherent difficulties, flat-rate taxation
offers a number of benefits, particularly to a developing economy.
Indeed, many of the difficulties associated with implementing the
switch to a flat tax come in the transitional stage when the old tax
This presents a great
system is replaced with the new.2 8

19.
See id.
20.
See id.
21.
See generally Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple,
ProgressiveConsumption Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27 (Michael J. Boskin
ed., 1996].
22.
See id. at 44. The authors discuss their proposal for the reform of the
U.S. tax system and propose a 19% flat rate on all individual and corporate
income. See id.
23.
See Graetz, supranote 15, at 530.
Horizontal equity would be achieved by "eliminating provisions which
24.
allow some taxpayers to reduce their taxes because of either the source of their
income or the type of expenditure." Id. at 531.
25.
See id.
26.
Hall & Rabushka, supra note 21, at 32. "All the taxpayer has to do is
report total wages, salaries, and pensions at the top, compute the family
allowance based on marital status and number of dependents, subtract the
allowance, multiply by 19 percent to compute the tax, take account of
withholding, and pay the difference or apply for a refund." Id.
27.
See generally Graetz, supra note 15, at 535-43 (discussing some of the
problems of a transition to a flat-rate tax).

28.

One of the most significant challenges involved in the transition to the

flat tax system in the United States would be protecting the expectations of
taxpayers who have relied on existing law in making long-term financial decisions.
See id. at 536. The magnitude of this problem would not be as great for a
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opportunity for developing countries with young tax schemes.
Because their tax laws are not fully crystallized, they are better
suited to withstand the inconveniences of the transitional stage.
One such developing economy-Poland's eastern neighbor,
Estonia-has recently implemented a flat tax with great
success.29 It joined Denmark and Iceland as the third European
30
state to use a flat rate taxation scheme.

III. THE CURRENT STATUS AND THE PROPOSED REFORM

OF THE POLISH TAx SYSTEM

A. Evolution of the Polish Tax System Since World War II
1. The Polish Tax System During the Communist Era: 19451989
During the communist era, when the state sector dominated
the economy, the phrase "government money" accurately reflected
Poland's lack of fiscal policy. State enterprise was managed
according to a central plan, in which a "production unit" was the
basic economic variable. 3 ' Producers were accountable for the
quantity of items manufactured rather than income generated
from production. Under such a system, fundamental concepts of
3 2
tax law such as gain, cost, and expenditure had no meaning.
Only with respect to tax liability of privately operated ventures, a
rarity at the time, were those definitions utilized in the very
primitive Polish tax code.3 3 It would be mendacious to describe
Poland's fiscal regulations of the communist era as a tax system.
Following the end of World War II, Poland reverted to the tax
system established during the period between World War I and

developing country whose tax system is not yet reliable enough to create such
expectations in the taxpayers. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
29.
Since the flat tax was implemented, Estonia has enjoyed a 10% per
year growth in its economy. See Jerzy Baczynski, Linia Podzialu [The Dividing
Line], POLITYKA, July 18, 1998, at 20; see generally European Taxation, Estonia,
Intl Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, June 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, INTLAW
Library, IBFDEU File (providing a concise summary of Estonia's individual tax
system).

30.

See Jerzy Baczynski & Jacek Mojkowski, Wielka rewolucjapodatkowa

Balcerowicza [Balcerowicz's Big Tax Revolution], POLITYKA, Sept. 5, 1998, at 3
[hereinafter Baczynski & Mojkowski].
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 10.
31.
32.
See id. The authors opine that any tax system not utilizing concepts of
price, income, gain, and cost is a fiction. See id.
33.
See id.
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World War

11.3

4

Its most

fundamental

element

was the

comprehensive income tax scheme.3 5 In 1945, an earned-income
tax (podatek od wynagrodzen)was singled out and set aside from
the scheme, marking the first major step in the tax restructuring
process.3 6 Within two years, the rest of the income tax section of
the Code was repealed along with most other provisions, making
room for a system that would better fit the needs of the newly
centralized economy.3 7 From 1948 to 1951, a new socialist policy
emerged.3 8 The foundation of that policy was the principle that
tax liability depended on the form of ownership of the taxable
unit.3 9 Consequently, the system provided for three different
groups of taxes: taxes imposed on individuals, taxes imposed on
the private sector, and taxes imposed on the state-operated sector
40
of the economy.
a. Tax Treatment of Individuals
The chronology of the individual income tax in communist
Poland begins with the 1945 imposition of the earned-income
tax. 4 1 As a variation on the idea of a comprehensive income tax
of the 1918-1939 era, it was the only tax to survive the sweeping
changes of the late forties. 4 2 Effective for some thirty years, the
earned-income tax was finally eliminated for public sector
employees during the 1971-1975 period. 43 The government
continued, however, to impose the tax on individuals employed in
the private sector, self-employed taxpayers, individuals receiving
income as a result of pursuing scientific careers, and those
pursuing careers in the arts and education. 44 The tax remained
in effect through the 1991 taxable year when the Polish tax
45
system underwent an extensive overhaul.

34.

See RYSZARD MASTALSKI, PRAWO PODATKOWE II-CZESC SZCZEGOboWA [TAX

LAW II-PARTICULAR PROVISIONS] 31 (2d. ed. 1998).
35.
See id.
36.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 10.
37.
See id.
38.
See id.
39.
See id.
40.
See id.
41.
See id.
42.
See MASTALSKI, supranote 34, at 31.
43.
44.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 10.
Taxes on the incomes from such activities were assessed at flat rates of

20% on the income of private sector employees, 10% on artists' and scientists'
incomes, and 20% on receipts of self-employed individuals. See id.
45.
See generally Ustawa o podatku dochokowym od osob fizycznych
[Personal Income Tax Statute] (July 26, 1991), Dz.U. z 1993 r. Nr 90, poz. 416 z
pozn. zm. [1993 Journal of Legislation, No. 90, item 416, with subsequent
changes], available in KODEKS PRAWNIKA 377 (Wydawnictwo Prawno-Ekonomiczne

INFOR, 1998) [hereinafter PIT Statute].
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In 1957, the government implemented the equalizing tax
(podatek wyrownawczy).4 6 The equalizing tax affected both
public and private sector employees whose income exceeded the
Under this
administratively established tax-free amount. 4 7
scheme, the government allowed deductions for expenses such as
building or renovating a house and for costs associated with
raising children. 48 After the 1971-1975 changes, the equalizing
tax was the only potential source of tax liability for public sector
employees.
b. Tax Treatment of the Private Sector
Compared to revenues generated by the state-owned entities,
the private sector's contribution to the Polish economy was only
marginally significant. Still, the government imposed two types of
taxes on privately owned enterprises: the operating tax (podatek
obrotowy) and the income tax (podatek dochodowy).4 9 The basis
for the tax liability under the operating tax was the quantity of
articles sold.5 0 Under the income tax, progressive rates were
applied to earnings generated by the privately owned entities. 5 '
One form of the operating tax was the so-called border tax
(podatek graniczny), imposed on private importers.5 2 The basis
for liability

under the

border tax was

the

amount

of goods

53
transported into the country for the purpose of redistribution.

Both the operating and income taxes survived through the 1993
taxable year 5 4 when they were reformed as part of the
comprehensive restructuring of the corporate income tax
scheme.5 5 The border tax lasted through 1994, when it too was
5 6
replaced by the import tax (podatekimportowy).

See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 10. The equalizing, along with
46.
the uniform income tax lasted through the 1991 overhaul. See id.
47.
See id. The equalizing tax scheme was a progressive one with marginal
rates ranging from 10% to 50%. At no time was the effective rate to exceed 40% of
taxpayer's income. See id.
48.
See id. at 11. There was also an exception for income generated while
in pursuit of a career in the arts. See id.
49.
See MASTALSKI, supranote 34, at 3 1.
50.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 11.
See id.
51.
52.
See id.
See id.
53.
See id. Corporate income tax underwent two changes at the end of the
54.
communist era. The first reform took place when the CIT Statute [Ustawa o
podatku od osob prawnych] of January 31, 1989 was implemented. The statute
was replaced three years later by the statute under the same name passed on
February 15, 1992. See MASTALSKI, supra note 35, at 45.
55.
See generally Ustawa o podatku dochodowym od osob prawnych
[Corporate Income Tax Statute] (February 15, 1992), Dz. U. z 1993 r. Nr 106, poz.
482 z pozn. zm. [1993 Journal of Legislation, No. 106, item 482, with subsequent
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The last years of the communist regime brought some
significant changes to the tax treatment of the private sector of
Until 1984, land used by
the Polish agricultural industry.
individuals for agricultural purposes was subject to the soil tax
(podatek gruntowy).5 7 Some other forms of agronomic enterprise,
the so-called special sections were subject to the progressive
equalizing tax.-8 The actual income of such enterprises was not
reported; rather, tax liability was calculated on the basis of a
centrally estimated norm fixed for each taxpayer and measured
production units.5 9 Starting in 1985, land hit with the soil tax as
well as many of the special section activities became subject to
the new agricultural tax (podatek rolny)-a modification of the soil
tax. 60 Poland then eliminated the agricultural tax with respect to
of
special section activities as a part of the radical restructuring
61
the Polish tax system during the 1991-1992 period.
c. Tax Treatment of the State-Operated Sector
The taxing of state-owned enterprises during the 1945-1989
62
era underwent a progression typical of centralized economies.
The taxing scheme initially followed the classic approach of taxing
entities based on their annual profit, but the government began to
depart from this approach in 1955.63 The new scheme utilized
the practice of most centralized economies, whereby taxes are
characterized as contributions to the budget and are in no way
tied to the taxpayer's profit. 6 4 The pendulum began swinging
back in 1982, when Poland passed the new tax law concerning
state-owned enterprises. 6 5 While it significantly departed from
the contributions-to-the-budget approach by utilizing the classic
tax-based-on-profit approach, it did not come full circle.6 6 The
new scheme utilized progressive rates based on profit margins

changes], availablein KODEKS PODATNIKA 661 (Wydawnictwo Prawno Ekonomiczne
INFOR, 1998) [hereinafter CIT Statute].
56.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 11.
57.

See id.

See id. Special section activities included commercial production of
58.
flowers, fruits and vegetables, activities involving greenhouse production as well
as poultry farming. See id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See MASTALSKI, supranote 34, at 43.
See id.
See id. at 44.
See id.
See id.
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rather than profits. 6 768 The 1982 law remained in effect until the
1989-1992 overhaul.
The role of Polish fiscal policy on economic development
during the communist era was marginal. 69 This lack of economic
impact was largely due to the fact that the state generated its
revenues without the fiscal event of change in ownership. 70 The
scheme, lacking that fundamental event, had neither social nor
economic stimulatory power, 7 1 and instead, the government was
It manipulated
forced to apply economic pressure directly.
people's incomes through central imposition of price and wage
controls. 72 Within this paternalistic model of governance, the
state had unlimited discretion in disposing of "government
money" and a citizen was but a passive client of the government
73
apparatus.
Corporate income tax, implemented in 1989, ended the fortyyear period of dissimilar tax treatment of state-owned versus
private entities. 74 The change was of great significance, as Poland
finally recognized the two ideologically different sectors of the
economy as equal in the fiscal sense. 75 That policy shift served
as the foundation for building public finance mechanisms based
on fiscal fairness. Implemented through the democratic process,
the reforms of the early nineties "returned the country [and its
money] back to the people." 76 These reforms began to repair the
damage that forty years of bad governance had caused the Polish
77
tax system.
2. The 1989-1992 Reforms
The government began reforming the Polish tax system in the
late 1980s. 78 The main objective of the reform was to build a
scheme utilizing solutions developed by free-market economies of

67.

See id.

68.

See id.

69.
See id. at 32.
70.
See id.
71.
See id.
See id.
72.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 5.
73.
74.
See MASTALSKI, supranote 34, at 45.
75.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 5.
Id.
76.
The free-market compatible tax system did not exist in the post-war
77.
The evolution of the Polish tax system, commenced in 1918, was
Poland.
effectively interrupted for forty years. Under the circumstances, the rebuilding of
the Polish tax system, initiated in 1989, had to be started anew. See MASTALSKI,

supranote 34, at 32.
78.
See id. at 45.
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The restructuring began with two fundamental

legislative acts. oFirst came the Corporate Income Tax Statute,
enacted in 1989 and later replaced in 1992 by the statute of the
same name.8 0 The second major step in the reform process was
the enactment of the Personal Income Tax Statute in 1991.81 The
1991-1992 overhaul eliminated several key taxes remaining from
the communist era. The losers included the individual earnedincome, equalizing taxes, as well as the income tax of private
sector enterprises and the agricultural tax imposed on special
82
section activities.
a. The New Approach to Taxing Individuals
The 1992 Personal Income Tax Statute was the fundamental
legislative act regulating taxation of individuals on incomes
generated from wages, self-employment, pensions, and alternative
profit-generating activities. 8 3 The scope of that legislative act was
intentionally broad, as it was founded on the principle of uniform
tax liability among all individuals.8 4 Thus, the statue affected all
residents, and in some cases foreign taxpayers, who generated
income from activities within Poland's borders.8 5
It also
presumed that all income was taxable, including value of any
86
services received by the taxpayer.
Despite the broad scope of the statute, some communist-era
solutions remained in effect even after 1992.87 Perhaps the most
controversial was the punitive tax imposed on state employers
who did not observe the administratively determined index of
allowed pay increases granted to their employees. 8 8 Enacted in
the early 1980s, this tax survived through 1996.89

79.
See id.
80.
The CIT statute was first enacted on January 31, 1989. It was
replaced on February 15, 1992. See id.
81.
The PIT statue came into being on July 26, 1991. See id.
82.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 11.
83.
See PIT Statute, supranote 45, art. 3, para. 1.
84.
See MASTALsKI, supranote 34, at 45.
85.
See PIT Statute, supranote 45, art. 3, para. 1. The statute reached all
residents of Poland as well as individuals whose presence in the country exceeded
183 days during a taxable year. The statute did not reach individuals who, while
in pursuit of employment for a foreign company, were temporarily present in
Poland during a taxable year. See id. para. 2.
86.
See generally id. art. 10, para. 1.
87.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 12.
88.
See id.
89.
See id.
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b. The New Approach to Taxing Legal Entities
The biggest changes in the Polish fiscal policy came with the
enactment of the Corporate Income Tax Statute. 90 Tax treatment
of legal entities under the 1989 statute was founded on the
principle of fiscal equality, which served as the basis for many
modem tax systems.9 1 This new approach was a departure from
the communist-era policy of different tax treatment based on the
form of ownership. 9 2 The 1989 statute imposed a uniform
income tax on all legal entities.9 3 Though in practice it did not
fundamentally change the way corporations were taxed, it did
achieve a uniformity of construction between the corporate and
the individual tax schemes. 94 It also brought the new Polish tax
system closer to its Western European counterparts. 95
3. Current Status of the Polish Tax System
Polish law defines tax as "any obligatory payment to the state
budget which is not subject to repayment, is unilateral and is
paid on the basis of a general law." 9 6 The Minister of Finance is

the highest Polish tax authority. 9 7 The Ministry is authorized to
promulgate orders and rulings to implement the resolutions of the
Council of Ministers. 9 8 The Ministry also oversees the lower tax
authorities, represents the treasury and controls the withholding
of taxes levied on individuals and legal entities. 9 9 The Ministry
has authority to abolish tax obligations and to defer or reduce tax
payments.1 0 0 Under Polish law, all individuals and entities with
or without legal personality are subject to the filing
requirement. 101

90.

See generally CIT Statute, supranote 55.
See MASTALSKI, supranote 34, at 45.
92.
See id.
93.
See id.
94.
See id.
95.
See id.
96.
Marek Waluga, Taxation and Investment in Poland, V Guides to Eur.
Tax'n: Tax'n & Investment in Cent. & E. Eur. Countries (Int'l Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation) § 4.1 (March 1998).
97.
See id. § 4.1.
98.
See id.

91.

99.

See id.

100.

See id.

101.

See id.
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a. Current Tax Treatment of Individuals
The most fundamental tax imposed on individuals is the
Personal Income Tax. 10 2 In 1997, it constituted 8.7% of the gross
national product (GNP). 10 3 The Code provides a comprehensive
list of the types of income subject to withholding. 1- 4 It also
contemplates that income, taxation of which would be
administratively impractical, would not be recognized. 10 5 Gains
from gifts and inheritances, treated in other sections of the Code,
are not subject to the Personal Income Tax.10 6 Final tax liability
is determined by applying three progressive rates to the difference
of gross income and deductions. 10 7 The tax rates in 1998 were
19%, 13%, and 40%,108 and the tax-free amount was 1772
10 9
zloty.
The Code thoroughly defines the taxable base. It includes,
though it is not limited to, income from dependent and
independent services, income from business and "special
branches" of agriculture, gains from real estate transactions,
rental income from real estate and income from money
investments and property rights.1 1 0 Capital gains are part of the
taxable base under income from money investments, income from
the sale of real estate or income from business."' In some cases,
capital gains from the sale of buildings and flats may be exempt
Otherwise, profits from the sale of real
from withholding." 2
estate and property rights are taxed at a flat rate of 20%." s
The 1982-1992 reforms of the Polish tax system came early
in the process of Poland's transition towards a free-market

102.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 15.
See id. app. 1.
103.
See PIT Statute art. 10, supra note 45.
104.
105.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 15.
See id.
106.
See id.
107.
In 1994 the government first increased the tax rates from then
108.
applicable 20%, 30%, and 40% to 21%, 33%, and 45%. They remained at this
level until 1997 when the government eliminated some deductions allowable to
high-income taxpayers. The change allowed the tax rates to be decreased to 20%,
32%, and 44%. In 1998, those rates were lowered again to 19% for income up to
25,252 zloty, 30% for income between 25,252 and 50,504 zloty, and 44% for
income above 50,504 zloty. See id. at 17.
109.
See id. at 18.
See PIT Statute, supra note 45, art. 10; see also European Taxation,
110.
Poland, Individual Tax Summary, INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, May 12,
1997, § 1.2, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, IBFDEU File [hereinafter
Individual Tax Summary].

111.
112.

See Individual Tax Summary, supra note 110, §§ 1.2.1(c), (e), (1).
Seeid. § 1.2.1(h).

113.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 30.
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economy." 4 Some sectors of the Polish economy could not keep
up with the fast pace of the fiscal reforms." 5 As a result, the tax
scheme required constant amendments in order to remain
compatible with the economy that was still to a large degree
centralized. 116 The byproduct of this race between the tax, and
other reforms is a large number of exclusions and deductions,
many of which are of social character." 7 Thus, exempt from
withholding are disability pensions of war and military invalids
and their families, child-care and childbirth benefits, and social
assistance to foster families." 8 The government also does not
recognize subsidies for individuals to purchase coal and
prescription drugs as income.1 1 9
The Code likewise provides for a number of deductions. 120
Many of them appear to have been designed to either encourage
taxpayers to incur certain expenses or influence particular
taxpayer behaviors. 12 1 For example, the housing deduction 12 2
provides a tax incentive for individuals intending to purchase
land for the purpose of constructing a house. 123
Certain
expenses for the purpose of expanding, renovating, and repairing
a building may likewise qualify as deductible.' 2 4 Other tax
incentives include deductions for certain charitable contributions,
certain membership fees, social security and other obligatory
contributions, as well as costs incurred by the tax-payer in

connection with his employment. 125 A taxpayer may also carry
forward losses in three equal parts and offset them against
ordinary income over three years.' 2 6
Individuals who derive their income from independent, small
business activities may fall under one of two exceptions to the

ordinary individual tax scheme.' 2 7 The so-called tax card is a
relatively
simple
scheme
of taxing privately
owned,
unincorporated enterprises.12 8 The taxpayer is not required to
114. See id. at 16.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Individual Tax Summary, supra note 110, § 1.2.1(h).
119. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 16.
120. See PIT Statute, supranote 45, art. 21.
121. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 18-19.
122. See id. at 19. The authors of THE WHITE BOOK opine that the housing
deduction has since its institution been ineffective. See id. During that period
42,278,000 zloty has been deducted under this provision yet the tax incentive has
not revived Poland's housing industry. See id. at 21.
123. See Individual Tax Summary, supra note 110, § 1.4.2(a).
124. See id. § 1.4.2(e).
125. See id. § 1.4.2.
126. See id. § 1.5.
127. See id. § 1.6.3.
128.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 32.
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conduct a regular accounting of his or her business, nor is he or
she subject to the requirement of filing a tax return. 1 29 Factors
such as location, type of enterprise, and number of employees
The tax authority communicates3 the
determine the tax. 130
amount of liability to the taxpayer through a private ruling.1 1
The second exception to the individual income tax scheme is
the discounted reported income. 13 2 Persons conducting small-

scale, independent business activities may take advantage of this
exception, which provides for flat rate withholdings on their
One determines the discounted reported income
incomes. 133
liability from the individual's reported earnings without taking
into consideration expenses incurred while generating that
income. 13 4 Depending on the type of business activity pursued
13 S
by the individual, either a 3.3%, 6%, or 9% fiat rate applies.
Under the current Personal Income Tax scheme, effective
rates vary greatly among taxpayers in the same marginal tax
bracket. 13 6 This effect is, to some degree, the result of the large
number of exceptions and deductions specifically aimed at
particular groups of taxpayers. In the bottom bracket, small
manufacturers and free-lance workers enjoy the lowest effective
rate of 11.15%. 13 7 Individuals, who derive their income from
more than one source, are next with a 14.79% effective rate
13 9
across the group. 138 Retirees are the first bracket losers.
Their average tax liability in 1997 was 15.16%. 14 0
The trend reverses in the second and third marginal tax
brackets.
There, retirees enjoy the lowest effective rate of
23.65%.14 1 Public and private sector employees are in the second
place with 27.17%, and self-employed individuals are the most
heavily taxed at a 34.55% effective rate. 14 2 In 1997, only 1.0% of
all taxpayers landed in the highest marginal bracket, 4.42% were

129.

See id.

130.

See id.

131.

See id.

132. See id. Discounted reported income (ryczalt od przychodow
ewidencjonowanyc) came into being in 1994. An individual is eligible for the
election under this provision if the earnings from his enterprise in the preceding
year did not exceed the amount of 288,700 zloty. See id.
133.
See id.
134.
See id.
135.
See Individual Tax Summary, supra note 110, § 1.6.3. In 1997, some
853,668 taxpayers took advantage of either the tax card or the discounted
reported income exceptions. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 33.
136.
See generallyTHE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 27-29.
137.
See id. at 26.
138.
See id.
139.
See id.
140.

See id.

141.
142.

See id.
See id.
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in the middle bracket, and 94.57% of taxpayers were taxed at the
1 43
lowest marginal rate.
Income from gifts and inheritances and increases in wealth
from the acquisition of property by adverse possession are subject
to withholding under the gift and inheritance taxes. 14 4 Polish
citizens and persons domiciled in Poland are likewise subject to

this tax if the received property is located abroad. 145 Gifts and
inheritances of property located in Poland are not subject to
withholding if the recipient is neither a citizen nor a taxpayer
14 6
domiciled in Poland.
Taxpayers are grouped under three categories based on the
relationship with the decedent or the donor. 14 7 The applicable
rates are determined by reference to those categories as well as
the value of the gift or inheritance.148 Generally, the more remote
the relationship and the more valuable the gift or inheritance, the
higher the taxable rate. 14 9 The most valuable gifts and
inheritances are subject to rates of 7%, 12%, and 20% for the
three groups respectively. 15 0
Property taken in adverse
possession is taxed at a separate flat rate of 7%.' s '
There are a number of exemptions from the inheritance and
gift tax liability.' 5 2 Most notably, gifts and inheritances valued
below a certain minimum amount are tax-free.15 3 This minimum
15 4
value varies for each of the three groups of taxpayers.
ss
Inherited furniture and clothing items are likewise exempt.
Individual small enterprises are exempt where the recipient is a
close relative of the donee. 15 6 Gifts from abroad are tax-free
provided they are transferred to Poland through a bank or a
Polish consulate. l S7 The donee is obligated to pay the tax while

143.
144.

See id. at 30.
See Individual Tax Summary, supranote 110, at 9.

145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. Group I includes spouses, children, stepchildren, sons and
daughters-in-law, parents, brothers, and sisters. See id. Group II included nieces
and nephews, spouses of brothers, and sisters. See id. All others taxpayers are in
Group Ill.
See id.

148.
149.

See id. at 10.
See id.

150. See id. Group I rates fall between 3% and 7% depending on the size of
the gift or inheritance. See id. Group II and III rates are from 7% to 12% and
from 12% to 20% respectively. See id.
151. See id.
152.
153.
154.
4600, and
155.
156.
157.

See id.
See id.
See id. The minimum amounts for Groups I through III are 6100,
3100 zloty respectively. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the donor remains jointly and severally liable for the amount
58
due.1
In addition to the personal income tax and the gift and
inheritance taxes, individuals in Poland may, in certain
situations, be subject to liability for additional taxes including
on the transfer of property, forest
agricultural taxes, stamp duties
59
taxes.1
local
other
and
taxes,
b. Current Tax Treatment of Legal Entities
The Polish tax system employs a classical double taxation
scheme with respect to corporate earnings.' 6 0 A legal entity's
income is fully taxed in the hands of the corporation, and the
16 1
profits are taxed again upon distribution as dividends.
Taxpayers subject to withholding in this manner include state
and cooperative enterprises and other entities with legal
personality including those with foreign participation. 1 62 The
system treats legal entities incorporated in Poland and companies
1 63
whose boards of directors are located in Poland as residents. 1 64
Their worldwide income is subject to withholding in Poland.
Not within the scope of the double withholding scheme are Polish
partnerships. 165 The individual partners are taxed separately
66
upon distribution of the partnership's profits.1
The most fundamental of the taxes imposed upon entities
with legal personality is the corporate income tax. 1 6 7 In 1997, its
share of the GNP was 3. 1%.168 Corporate entities must withhold
1 69
to the extent their income exceeds their business expenses.
Some of the deductible business expenses include depreciation,
damage to assets, research and development expenditures, taxes,

158.

See id.

159. For a discussion of value added and other indirect taxes, see
discussion infra Part III.A.3.c. For a comprehensive overview of all taxes affecting
individuals in Poland, see generally Waluga, supra note 96.
See Corporate Tax Summary, European Taxation, Poland, INT'L BUREAU
160.
OF FIScAL DOCUMENTATION, May 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
IBFDEU File [hereinafter Taxation of Corporations].

161.

See id.

See id.
162.
163.
See id.
See id.
164.
165.
Exempt from the corporate income tax are also the National Bank of
Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski) and the State Treasury (Skarb Panstwa). See id.

§5.1
166. See id.
167. In 1997, money generated by imposing this tax constituted over 13% of
all government revenues. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 36.
168. See id. app. 1.
169. See Taxation of Corporations,supranote 160, at 2.
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and charitable contributions. 1 70 Non-deductible items include,
among others, the cost of earning tax-exempt income, interest on
taxpayer's capital invested for profit, fines, and fiscal penalties. 171
There is likewise a long list of tax exempt categories of income.
This list includes income allocated to the statutory objectives of
corporations involved in charitable or educational activities,
certain profits of trade unions and political parties, income from
foreign sources pursuant to international agreements, and
72
income of taxpayers employing disabled persons. 1
The corporate income tax contemplates certain tax
The most significant of those are investment
incentives.
allowances, tax holidays, and tax relief for companies investing in
certain economic zones. 173 A company may benefit from an
investment allowance when it incurs certain investment
expenditures such as the cost of purchasing and assembling
machinery and the cost of purchasing intangibles. 174 Likewise,
when a company engages in business in certain predetermined
economic zones, it may enjoy favorable tax treatment. 175 Under
the special economic zones incentive, companies may even enjoy
Certain
a total exemption from corporate tax liability. 176
companies that participate in foreign markets and are capitalized
from foreign sources may also enjoy income tax holidays. 17 7 All
of those incentives share a similar objective of encouraging
investment in the Polish economy, particularly in zones with
retarded economic growth. 178 They are also intended to function
as motivation for taxpayers to disclose their earnings. 17 9 Despite

their attractiveness, in 1997, only 2% of taxpayers subject to the
corporate income tax took advantage of those incentives. 180
Capital gains of entities with legal personality are likewise
subject to withholding. 1 8 ' Depending on their type, capital gains
may be subject to corporate income tax, a 20% reduced rate, or
Dividends received by
exemption from taxes altogether.'8 2
corporate entities fall into the middle category.' 8 3 Capital gains
of non-resident entities from the sale of publicly traded stock

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id. at 4-5.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 36.
See id.
See id.
See Taxation of Corporations,supranote 160, at 4.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 36.
See id.
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obtained on the Warsaw Stock Exchange may in some cases be
tax exempt. 18 4 Poland has entered a number of treaties with
other European partners to avoid the double taxation of capital
gains. Pursuant to those treaties, the rates of taxation of such
gains vary from 0% to 15%.185
c. Social Security, Payroll, and Transaction Taxes
Social Security and Payroll taxes impose a particularly heavy
burden upon employers.' 8 6 The social welfare system reform has
been slow since the commencement of Poland's transition toward
a free market economy.' 8 7
The ghosts of the centralized
economy, lurking everywhere,
have continuously
posed
challenges to the budget drafters. It seems that the new tax
system is not quite compatible with such communist era relics as
the Polish archaic health care system.' 8 8 One of the by-products
of this situation is the high social security tax imposed on
employers.' 8 9 Employers are obligated to contribute 45% of each
employee's salary to the Social Insurance Fund.' 90 Additionally,
3% of the employee's wages go to the Labor Fund, which covers
unemployment.' 9 1 Finally, employers make a 0.18% contribution
to the Fund of the Warranted Employee's Claims and in some
cases an additional donation to the National Fund for
Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons. 192 In sum, for each person in
the lowest personal income bracket, the employer pays over 74%
of the employee's net wages in social security payroll and income
taxes. 193 For more qualified employees, this percentage increases
to over 111% for persons in the second marginal income bracket,
and in case of the highest paid employees, the contribution
94
reaches an astonishing 146% of that employee's net salary.'
One of the most fundamental changes in the Polish tax
system came with the addition of the value-added tax (VAT) in

184.

See Taxation of Corporations,supra note 160, at 4.

185.
186.
187.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 36.
See generally Waluga, supra note 96, at 59.
See generally Joanna Solska, Inwalida w

obrotach lInvalid's Ride],

POLITYKA, Nov. 28, 1998, at 3.

188.

See IMF Assessment, supra note 2, at 311. The report informs of the

IMF Directors' encouragement of the Polish government to press forward with
pension and health care system reforms. See id.
189.

See Waluga, supra note 96, at 59.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 50.
See id.
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1993.195 All individuals and entities with legal personality that,
during the course of business, supply goods or services, are
subject to the withholding of VAT. 196 This includes taxpayers
who receive imported services. 19 7 Exempt, however, are those
taxpayers whose turnover in the preceding year did not exceed a
certain amount. 198 Also, those taxpayers filing under the tax
card exception to the personal income tax are not subject to
withholding of VAT. 199
The VAT taxable basis is turnover.20 0 In the case of imported
services, the basis is the amount paid for the services by the
importer. 2 0 1 One major exemption from VAT applies to the sale of
an enterprise or an organized part of an enterprise. 20 2 Likewise
dairy products, unprocessed meat and poultry, raw agricultural

products, artistic products, postal, financial, insurance and
health care services as well as services connected with science,
development of technology, education, culture, art, and sport are
exempt from VAT. 2 03 Although not exempt, a 0% rate also applies
to books, maps and other publications, and the export of goods
and services. 20 4
The applicable rates for the non-exempt
transactions are a 7% reduced rate on certain goods and services,
and a standard 22% rate on all others.2 0 5 Value-added tax
6
generated 8.3% of Poland's 1997 GNP. 20
An excise tax is yet another recent addition to the scheme of
fiscal regulation. The government brought back the tax as a part
of the VAT Statute after almost fifty years.2 0 7 Producers and
importers of luxury goods, 20 8 including alcoholic beverages,
tobacco products, salt, engine ois and fuels, cars, yachts, some
electronic equipment, perfumes, playing cards, and equipment for
operating games and mutual betting must pay the excise tax.20 9
The tax is also imposed on producers or importers who

195. See generally Ustawa o podatku od towarow i uslug oraz o podatku
akcyzowym [The Value Added and Excise Tax Statute], Dz.U. z 1997 r. Nr 11, poz.
50 z poz. zm. [1997 Journal of Legislation, No. 11, item 50, with subsequent
changes] (Jan. 8, 1993), available in KODEKS PRAWNIKA 147 (Wydawnictwo PrawnoEkonomiczne INFOR, 1998) [hereinafter VAT Statute].
196. See Waluga, supra note 96, at 63.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.

200.
201.

See id.
See id.

202.
203.

See id.
See id. at 63-64.

204.

See id. at 64.

205.

See id.

206.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, app. 1.

207.
208.

See generally VAT Statute, supra note 195.
See Waluga, supranote 96, at 65.

209.

See id.
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of its
excessively waste any excisable good during any stage
21
turnover. 2 10 The export of excisable goods is tax exempt.
2 12
The base for the tax is the turnover of the excisable goods.
The rates differ with respect to producers and importers. 2 13 For
the former, rates vary from the standard 25% rate to 40% on cars
and up to 95% on spirits. 2 14 Importers' rates are considerably
higher 2 15 and reflect the government's protection of two major
manufacturing sectors: automotive and alcohol industries. The
standard rate and the rate on cars are 40% and 75%
respectively. 2 16 It increases to 230% for wine products, beer,
tobacco, and non-spirits alcohol products, 400% for fuels and oil
2 17
In 1997, the
and finally to a draconian 1900% for spirits.
2 18
GNP.
Poland's
of
4%
generated
tax
excise
Yet another element in the scheme of taxation of transactions
is the game tax. 2 19 This tax came into being under the Law on
Games of Chance and Mutual Betting enacted in 1992.220 The
tax is imposed on games and mutual betting activities and is a
The tax rates vary
substitute for VAT and excise tax.2 2 1
depending on the kind of game or betting activity, ranging from
105% to 60%.222 The game tax generated 0.1% of the GNP in
1997.223

B. Proposed Changes
1. Balcerowicz's Mid-Term Economic Strategy
In 1998, Poland's Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz
pushed for an economic plan that would lead the country into the
He proposed a so-called mid-term
twenty-first century. 22 4
economic strategy, which encompassed the years 1999 through

210.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 40.
See Waluga, supra note 96, at 65.
211.
See id.
212.
213.
See id.
See id. Producers' rates on non-spirit alcohol products and fuels and
214.
oils are 70% and 80%, respectively. See id.
See id.
215.
216.
See id.
See id.
217.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, app. 1.
218.
See Waluga, supra note 96, at 66-68.
219.
See id.
220.
See id.
221.
See id.
222.
223.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, app. 1.
See Cabinet to Resume Consideration of Balcerowicz's Mid-Term
224.
Strategy, 8 BNA's E. EUR. REP. 322 (May 4, 1998).
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2001.225 The two main objectives that the Ministry aimed to
achieve were the acceleration of privatization and the
simplification of the tax system. 2 26 Although criticism continues
to daunt Balcerowicz's plan, help from a large number of the
Minister's supporters and the sheer persuasiveness of his
arguments have fostered a gradual implementation of his
227
strategy.
Balcerowicz's plan seeks to speed the process of privatization
by intensifying the government's effort to sell off state holdings in
certain sectors such as the defense industry. 228 Additionally, the
plan advocates the government's active involvement in increasing
the number of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. 22 9
As a final objective, the mid-term economic
strategy seeks to simplify the Polish tax system by introducing
single rate taxation on all corporate and individual incomes. 2 30
2. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Government's Plan
In the White Book of Tax, the Ministry of Finance revealed
the theoretical underpinnings of the proposal. 2 3 1 The drafters
subscribe to the view that the effectiveness of a taxing system
depends on four criteria. First, the scheme must reward
232
taxpayers for engaging in activities that promote productivity.
Second, the scheme must be administratively efficient and simple
in order to minimize both the burden of filing upon the taxpayer
and the burden of collecting upon the taxing authority. 2 3 3 The
third criterion is the explicitness of the scheme-the law must be
precise and unambiguous. 2 34 Finally, an efficient tax system
must be stable, allowing taxpayers to plan and implement their
long-term financial strategies. 2 35 The Ministry recognizes that

225.
See id.
226.
See id.
227.
Bogdan Wyznikiewicz, Director of the Gdansk Institute for Market
Economics opined that the Cabinet would likely approve Balcerowicz's plan. See
Link to Privatization Plan, 8 BNA's E. EURP. REP. 332 (May 4, 1998). He also
expressed his view of Balcerowicz as "the most experienced policy maker in
Poland, and possibly Eastern Europe." Id. He was likewise impressed with the
strength of the Minister's arguments in the debate over the benefits of his midterm strategy. See id.
228.
See id.
229.
See id.
230.
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
231.
See generallyTHE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13.
232.
See id. at 58.
233.
See id.
234.
See id.
235.
See id.
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stabilization of the tax system must be preceded by a reform that
23 6
would ensure the achievement of the first three criteria.
Designing a scheme that rewards productivity and taldng
23 7
initiative is, according to the drafters, a critical objective.
Fiscal regulation should play a role in ensuring that benefits
associated
with
being
employed
always
outweigh the
attractiveness of remaining unemployed.2 3 8 As a general rule, a
taxpayer's income should correlate with his or her effectiveness
and hard work.2 3 9 Trying to earn more must always make
financial sense. 2 4 ° The incentive must also be there for the
taxpayer to pursue higher education. 2 4 1
Withholding at
progressive rates defeats that objective, as higher education
ordinarily corresponds with higher earnings and much greater tax
liability. 2 42
On the corporate side, the system must encourage employers
to create jobs. 2 43 Poland must remain fiscally competitive in
order to encourage both native and foreign businesses to operate
there and hire local workers. 2 4 4 The tax system should also
reward technological innovation. 2 45 This objective necessitates a
more favorable treatment of capital gains over those from other
types of financial investments. 2 4 6 Finally, as a general rule, the
2 47
scheme must not favor consumption over saving.
3. The Essence of the Proposed Reform
There are five core objectives that underlie the proposed tax
system reform. 2 48
The first of these captures the most
fundamental social and economic goals of the current
government: to maintain the annual national economic growth
2 49
above 6% over the next ten years and to create more jobs.
Second, the drafters aim to increase public trust in the taxing
authority and to eliminate opportunities for abuse and
manipulation of the system.2 5 0 Third, the new tax system must

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See id.
See id. at 59.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

242.

See id.

243.
244.
245.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 60.

246.

See id.

247.

See id.

248.

See id. at 57.

249.

See id.

250.

See id.
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ensure Poland's adaptability to the changing economic climate in
Europe-it must be attractive to foreign firms and capital and
remain friendly to foreign investors. 2 5 '
Fourth, the scheme
should be able to adapt to future changes in Poland's economy,
such as increased local autonomy and the anticipated
reorganization of the health care system.2 5 2 Finally, the new tax
system must ensure Poland's compliance with the strict economic
requirements of the European Union. 25 3
The reform plan
submitted by the Ministry of Finance attempts to achieve all five
25 4
of these objectives.
The reform is to progress through four stages. 2 5 It will begin
in 1999 with a reduction in the number of personal income tax
brackets and an increase in the amount not subject to
withholding. 25 6 The new marginal rates will be 22% and 32%,
and the corporate rate will be decreased from 36% to 32%. In
2000, the personal income tax rate will be reduced to a flat
22%%, marking the second stage in the reform. 25 7 That same
year, the corporate income tax rate will drop to 26% and the new
comprehensive tax law, governing the taxation of all entities
25 8
regardless of their form and income sources, will go into effect.
In the last two stages, the corporate rate will decrease to 24%,

and finally, the asymmetry between the corporate and the
individual rates will be eliminated by the year 2002 with the
2 59
implementation of a flat 22% rate.
One of the goals of the reform is to immediately lessen the tax
burden on individuals with low income. 2 60 This objective will be
achieved despite the initial increase in the lowest individual
income rate from 19% to 22%.261 To counterbalance the effect of
that increase, the amount of income not subject to withholding
will increase from 1772 zloty in 1998 to 3600 zloty in 1999.262
These initial steps, according to the Ministry of Finance, will
actually decrease the effective rate of taxation for low-income

251.
See id.
252.
See id.
253.
See id.
254.
See id.
255.
See id. at 63.
256.
See id.
257.
See id.
258.
See id.
259.
See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
260.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 62.
261.
See id. at 63.
262. The tax free amount was, until 1998, expressed as a standard
deduction to be subtracted from the final tax liability. This amount was 336.60
zloty in 1998, and it corresponded with 1772 zloty of income not subject to
withholding. See id. at 18.
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individuals from the current average of 14.97% to 13.46%.263
Additionally, two favorable exceptions to the individual tax
scheme for small businesses, the tax card and the discounted
26 4
reported income, will likewise be utilized in the new system.
An essential aspect of the reform is the elimination of most
deductions and exclusions from the tax scheme. 2 65 This step is
consistent with the reform's broad goal of achieving equality of
tax treatment among entities irrespective of their form and the
More importantly, the
character of their enterprise. 2 6 6
elimination of those tax incentives will increase the taxable base,
which will ensure that the reform process will not decrease the
revenues generated by the government. 2 67 In fact, the Ministry of
Finance expects the reform to finance itself.2 68 Taxpayers
will continue
currently taking advantage of certain tax 2incentives
69
to be able to do so under the new scheme.
Yet another significant aspect of the reform is the change in
tax treatment of agricultural enterprises. 2 70 The drafters clearly
considered the diversity among the players in this industry. On
the one hand, large enterprises will be subject to withholding
under the same principles as all other corporations. 2 7 1 On the
other hand, smaller enterprises will pay taxes in an amount
based on the size of the farm. 2 72 These small producers will not
be forced to keep track of their income and expenses for tax
purposes.2 73 This difference in treatment reflects the reality of
the industry that many of the smaller farms are run by older,
2 74
often under-educated owners.
While the reform does not plan on bringing changes in the
gift and inheritance tax schemes, the real estate value tax will
replace the current real estate tax.2 75 This new tax will also
replace the forest and the agricultural taxes. 2 7 6 The basis for
assessing liability under the real estate value tax will be an
appraisal of the property and not, as it was under the former
taxes, its size. 2 7 7 Assessment of the real estate value tax will

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See id. at 64.
See id. at 71.
See id. at 62.
See id.
See id.
See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
See THE WHITE BOoK, supranote 13, at 67.
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See id.

271.

See id.

272.

See id.
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See id.
See id.
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276.

See id. at 82.
See id. at 83.
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require granting greater responsibilities to the local taxing
This will go hand in hand with the general
authorities. 2 78
decentralization of Poland's government-a process that is
2 79
already under way.
No fundamental changes are expected in either the valueadded or the excise tax schemes, although the Ministry of
Finance will be forced to address the issue of Poland's compliance
with the European Union's requirements. 28 0 The Ministry will
have to make the biggest adjustments with the value-added tax
on raw agricultural products, building materials, books and
Certain
magazines, and cultural and artistic services. 28 '
adjustments will also affect the excise tax. Most notably, the
government will raise the tax on gasoline to comply with the
28 2
standards imposed by the European Union.

IV.

WILL THE FLAT TAx

WORK

FOR POLAND?

A. Is There a Need for Change?
That the Polish tax system is in need of reform is, to many,
not immediately obvious. The fact that Poland's economy has
been strong makes the task of convincing Balcerowicz's critics of
the benefits of reform that much more difficult. Their argumentthat the current tax system is not interfering with the economic
growth-is not easily discounted without a thorough examination
of the system itself. A closer look at the tax law reveals its
weaknesses and provides strong counter-evidence to the
argument of Balcerowicz's opponents.
1. Tax Burden Imposed on Employers
Perhaps the most obvious defect of the current system is the
exorbitant tax burden on employers, in particular, those with
legal personality. 28 3 First, corporations are subject to a high,
36% rate of withholding on their incomes. 28 4 Poland's CIT rate is
significantly higher than that of its Eastern European

278.

See id. at 84.

279,

See id.

280.

See id. at 72. For an overview of EU's tax harmonization measures, see

generally, Tracy A. Kaye, EuropeanTax Harmonizationand the Implicationsfor U.S.

Tax Policy, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 109 (1996).
281. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 72.
282, See id. at 80.
283. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.
284. See THE WHITE BOOK supranote 13, at 37.
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counterparts where the rates fall between 18% (Hungary) and
29% (Czech Republic). 28 5
Secondly, Poland's employers
contribute between 74% and 146% of each employee's net wages
in social security, payroll, and individual income taxes. 28 6 Here
again, Poland lands nowhere near the European average of
2
53%. 87 The negative impact of this arrangement on the Polish
economy is self-evident.
The high tax burden imposed on employers is a tremendous
disincentive to create new jobs.2 8 8
The large number of
individuals who work off the books is evidence that employers
could create the positions if it made economic sense for the
employers to do so.2 8 9 Faced with the alternative of being able to
save significantly by hiring employees illegally, employers often
pursue that option. 2 90 Likewise, employees themselves have little
incentive to increase their qualifications. 2 9 1 Knowing that they
are more likely to be hired for entry-level, low paying positions,
they are reluctant to pursue higher education. This arrangement
creates a particularly destructive effect on Poland's hightechnology industry by significantly slowing its growth 2 9 2-a
consequence that is unacceptable to a country trying to compete
with highly-developed Western European economies.
2. Complexity of the Tax Code
Another major fault of the existing tax system is its
complexity. The law is now replete with tax incentives, most of
them added to the scheme during the 1993-1997 period. 2 93 In
the personal income tax alone, 125 exclusions may be found in
2 94
both the statute and the accompanying Treasury regulations.
Some twenty-nine deductions supplement the list of tax
incentives for individuals. 2 95 Forty more exclusions apply to legal
entities and an additional seventeen benefit value-added

285.
See id. at 50.
The authors speculate both the Czech and the
Hungarian governments intended for these low rates to stimulate reinvestment of
capital. See id.
286.
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.
287.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 50. For further comparison,
U.S. and Japanese averages are 36% and 34%, respectively. See id.

288.
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290.
291.
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293.

See id.
See discussion
See Baczynski
See THE WHTE
See id.
See Baczynski

294.
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See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 52.
Thirteen of those deductions are above the line and sixteen are below

the line. See id.

infra Part IV.A. 1, A.4.
& Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
BOOK, supranote 13, at 51.
& Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
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taxpayers. 2 9 6 Finally, the tax authorities maintain broad power
to waive income tax obligations, set up payment plans or even
297
forego enforcement against taxpayers, on a case-by-case basis.
This multitude of tax incentives has an inescapable
consequence of creating an unfair advantage for taxpayers whose
financial
position
allows
them
to
make
deductible
expenditures. 2 98 In 1997, 81% of the second bracket and nearly
90% of third-bracket taxpayers claimed a deduction on their tax
returns. 2 99
By contrast, only 39% of taxpayers in the first
bracket benefited from such tax incentives.3 0 0
Minimum
amounts of expenditure and other qualifying requirements keep
the deductions out of poor taxpayers' reach. 30 ' Complexity of the
law only exaggerates the problem, as uneducated and elderly
taxpayers are often unaware of their eligibility for deductions and
cannot afford professional tax advice. This effect is evident in the
302
first bracket in which retirees suffer the highest effective rates.
The complexity of the tax system may also discourage
taxpayers from reporting their incomes.3 0 3
When the new
personal income tax system was initially implemented in 1991,
the drafters did not contemplate the large number of taxpayers
30 4
who would opt to independently calculate their own taxes.
Since then, a growing number of tax incentives and continuous
creation of new income sources have forced more and more

taxpayers to fill out their own tax forms. Today, nearly 60% of all
taxpayers tackle these forms, often devoting days to conquering
the task.3 0 5 As the complexity of the system increases, more and
more taxpayers may decide to take their chances and abstain

296.
See id.
297.
See id.
298.
See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supranote 30, at 3.
299.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 20. The most popular of
them-the housing deduction-has stimulated new home construction while the
rest of the industry has for many years remained stagnant. See id. The
retirement account deduction has benefited only the very few who can afford such
accounts. See id. The deduction for expenditures on educational tools is reserved
for those who can make the qualifying purchases. See id. at 21. Wealthy parents
can also deduct their children's private school tuition. See id. at 22.
300.
See id. at 29 tbl. 15.
301.
For example, the housing deduction has a minimum amount of
expenditure requirement. See id. at 21. People who can afford to build their own
home benefit greatly from that incentive. See id. On the other hand, those who
merely renovate their living quarters often do not spend enough to qualify for a
write off, See id. at 22.
302.
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a.
303.
See Baczynski & Mojkowsld, supra note 30, at 3.
304.
See id.
305.
See id.
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from filing rather than spend endless hours trying to make sense
30 6
of the law.
Finally, the complexity and instability of the tax system are
both detrimental to taxpayers' ability to formulate long-term
financial plans. During the 1992-1998 period, Poland amended
30 7
the personal income tax scheme on thirty separate occasions.
The corporate income and the value-added tax schemes have
likewise changed numerous times during that period. 30 8 While
most of the amendments have been implemented as legislative

repairs of the faulty scheme, many of them were politically
motivated and cannot be otherwise justified. 30 9 The effect has
been a tax system in motion, with no predictable future.
Taxpayers are unable to foresee the future consequences of their
financial decisions with any degree of certainty, and in many
cases, they forego the speculation. This harmful effect cannot
continue if Poland is to compete with other European
entrepreneur-friendly taxing schemes.
3. Ambiguity of the Tax Code
In addition to its overwhelming complexity, Poland's tax laws
lack clarity. They are often poorly structured and written using
Each aspect of
language that promotes misinterpretations.3 1 0
the fiscal scheme is a jigsaw puzzle in which the pertinent statute
is but one of the pieces. To understand the personal income
taxation scheme, a taxpayer must cross-reference the PIT statute,
including its thirty amendments, with a few dozen Union statutes
containing supplementing definitions, thirteen directives of the
Ministry of Finance and nineteen directives of the Council of
Then that taxpayer must analyze the tens of
Ministers. 3 1
thousands of rulings issued by the tax authority each year, often
3 12
with conflicting results on identical facts.
Because of the ambiguities inherent- in the tax laws, the
taxing authority must endure tremendous administrative costs.
The cost of researching and issuing the thousands of inter-

See Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Casefor a National
306.
Sales Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 110, 112-13 (M. Boskin ed., 1996)
(providing a discussion of the effort American taxpayers put into completing their
tax forms); see also M. Scotland Morris, Reframing The FlatTax Debate: Three NotSo-Easy Steps For Evaluating Radical Tax Reform Proposals,48 FLA. L. REV. 159,

162 (1996).
307. See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 53.
308.
309.
310.
craft." Id.
311.
312.

See id.
See id.
The authors criticize the drafters for using language "lacking legislative
See id. at 52.
See Baczynsld & Mojkowski, supranote 30, at 3.
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pretative decisions year by year is undoubtedly high.3 1 3 Indeed,
not even the White Book of Tax discloses the annual cost of
executing the fiscal regulations.3 14 One author has characterized
this peculiar state of affairs, in which highly skilled tax specialists
devote endless hours to unraveling the mysteries of the scheme,
as "a waste of human energy and talent."3 1 5 As if the
interpretative costs were not enough, the taxing authority incurs
significant expenses trying to enforce the ambiguous tax laws
upon taxpayers who become misinformed or who otherwise
misinterpret the Code entirely in good faith.3 16 Ultimately, the
administrative costs affected by the unnecessary complexity and
ambiguity of the law are imposed on the taxpayer through higher
taxes.
Ambiguity of the tax laws creates an incentive for taxpayers
to defraud the government. Knowing that the administration is
not sure how to interpret the Code, taxpayers often misuse tax
incentives. 3 17 For example, it is not unusual for a taxpayer to
claim the cost of an expensive vacuum cleaner as a medical
deduction or write off the cost of a bicycle or a summer vacation
under the physical education deduction.3 1 8 When confronted
with having to justify the deduction, taxpayers point to
ambiguous Code provisions and employ the good faith mistake
3 19
pardon.
The consequences of this arrangement are troubling. On the
one hand, the honest taxpayer suffers, as the government
externalizes the tax abuse losses by increasing the rates. On the
other hand, the reputation of the taxing authority suffers as a
result of frequent confrontations with the taxpayers. 320 The latter
consequence is particularly unwanted during Poland's difficult
transition to a free-market economy, as the symbiotic relationship
between the government and its citizens is a critical element of
the reform's success.
4. Gray-Market
The expression gray-market refers to all forms of concealed
tax evasion. 32 1 It captures conscious and purposeful efforts to
circumvent the tax system, including deliberate non-compliance

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See id.
See generally,THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13.
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See id.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 53.

POLAND'S FLAT TAX PROPOSAL

1999]

1431

with formal requirements and refusing to discharge tax
obligations. 3 2 2 It is estimated that in 1994, production of the
gray-market sector of the economy constituted 18% of Poland's
This statistic does not include
gross domestic product.3 23
taxpayers who openly refused to pay taxes, a phenomenon
state-owned
remaining
the
by
practiced
increasingly
3
enterprises. 2
Various inadequacies of the tax system are to blame for
Poland's unusually large gray market. In particular, the high
corporate income tax rate creates a tremendous incentive for
corporations to understate their taxable incomes. They easily
accomplish this by concealing their actual gains or overstating
their operating costs. 326 Another common practice among many
smaller finns is underreporting employees' incomes in order to
avoid the high tax burden imposed upon employers. 3 26 Many
corporations hire employees either off the books or as
independent contractors in order to avoid this liability
altogether 3 2 7 Finally, it is not unusual for importers to conceal
the value of their turnover in order to avoid value added or excise
tax liability. 32 8 This is accomplished through false invoices that
32 9
get "overlooked" by corrupted tax administration employees.
Amazingly, most businesses engaging in such activities are
properly registered and otherwise law-abiding taxpayers. It is
estimated that some 70% of the gray-market output may be
3 30
attributed to such businesses.
The second incentive for firms to engage in tax evasion is the
low risk of getting caught. Here the complex, ambiguous tax law,
the administrative inefficiency of the tax authority, and the
primitive enforcement methods contribute to the problem.
Individuals often choose to operate their enterprises in
unregistered form, thereby remaining beyond the reach of the
taxing scheme in order to maximize their profits. Indeed, over
30% of the gray-market output comes from unregistered
enterprises that do not report their incomes at all. 3 3 ' In the end,
the revenue loss generated by this group along with the losses

See id.
322.
323.
See id. at 54. The organ that issued the report in 1994 noted the
decreasing tendency of this phenomenon and predicted that the gray-market
output would continue to diminish by 1% per year. See id.
See id.
324.
See id. at 55.
325.
See id.
326.
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328.
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attributable to the registered gray-market enterprises are imposed
on other taxpayers in the form of higher taxes. One of the
fundamental goals of the proposed tax reform is to minimize the
gray market's contribution to the gross domestic product.
5. Political Nature of the Legislative Process
Since the 1991-1992 reforms, the tax system has become a
political marketplace where wealthy interest groups buy tax
incentives.3 3 2 Indeed, most of them are byproducts of the
political process and not effects of a planned economic
strategy.3 3 3 In a properly functioning tax system, deductions
stimulate various economic behaviors. 3 3 4 They are "crafted in
consultation with domestic interests," and incite the "individuals
and companies to work toward perceived national goals."3 3 5

In

Poland, the misuse of tax incentives has become so pervasive that
politicians today perceive the discussion of tax issues as nothing
but a method of gaining voters.3 36 National interests and
economic goals are rarely a part of the legislative debate
surrounding the passing of tax law amendments.3 3 7 As one
author pointed out, "to this day, in the Ministry of Finance
documents, one will find neither the justifications for many of the
deductions and exclusions nor the analysis of the fiscal
338
consequences of their implementation."
6. Progressive Tax Ill Logic
Poland bases its idea of fiscal fairness on the principle that
wealthier taxpayers should pay more than the less fortunate
ones.3 3 9 The initial progressive rates of 20%, 30%, and 40% were

332.
See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
333.
See id.
334. The proposition has received its share of criticism particularly from the
proponents of the principle of neutrality. Indeed, one author opines that "the
temptation to use fiscal instruments to achieve nonfiscal purposes is unlikely to
be held down for long." Richard M. Bird, Experiencefrom a Century of Change, in
TAX POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17, 27 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988).
335.
Lawrence H. Summers, Taxation In a Small World, in TAX POLICY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 334, at 64 (the statement particularly refers to
the U.S. tax system).
336.
See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supranote 30, at 3.
337.
See id.
338. Id.
339.
See id. Professor Michael J. Graetz believes that "multiple tax rates
serve one of two purposes, (1) they enable the legislature to favor certain types of

investment or consumption, or (2) they reflect a belief that fairness demands some
progressive rates in a tax system." Flat Tax: Hearings on the Flat Tax Proposal
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Justus S.
Hotchkiss Professor of Law), availablein 1995 WL 306776. On the later point, he
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Yet the political
designed to conform with that objective. 3 4°
reality has set the tax system on a different course. As the
number of tax incentives has steadily increased over the years,
and as many of such incentives benefited primarily the taxpayers
in the higher brackets, the effective rates between the three
It became obvious that on a
groups began converging. 3 4 1
fundamental level, Poland's highly politicized multi-incentive
approach and the progressive rates were irreconcilable, as the
former destroyed what the latter had set out to achieve.3 4 2 As the
government's fiscal strategy became increasingly convoluted, the
once critical idea of fiscal fairness slowly became a secondary
concern in the debate over the tax system.
The complete lack of rhyme or reason in the tax system is
evident from analyzing current statistical data. The fact that
5.4% of individuals contribute 33% of all personal income tax
revenues3 43 speaks volumes about the unfairness of the current
scheme. Paradoxes likewise abound in the first bracket, in which
retirees pay taxes at higher effective rates than do both sole
entrepreneurs and individuals who derive their income from
multiple sources. 34 4 The poorest first bracket taxpayers, those
with income not exceeding 5000 zloty, are taxed at a rate 1.1%
higher than the rest of the group.3 45 Because the first bracket
includes over 95% of all taxpayers,3 4 6 its problems are not merely
illustrative examples-they reflect the confused state of the entire
tax system.
Poor fiscal planning, conflicting interests, and powerful
political forces have, over the last decade, caused the scheme to
slip deeper and deeper into chaos. Today's laws are too complex,
too ambiguous and full of inconsistencies. They slow the growth
of Poland's economy and promote fiscal inequality. Drastic steps
must now be taken to set Poland's fiscal policy back on the right

quotes the New York Times columnist William Saire: "Most of us accept as 'fair'
this principle: the poor should pay nothing, the middlers something, the rich the
highest percentage." Id.
For the chronology of PIT rate changes, see supra note 108 and
340.
accompanying text.
341.
Between 1994-1996, effective rates in the three brackets steadily
converged from 16.9%, 20.1%, 29.4% in 1994 to 15.8%, 16.8%, 29.2% in 1995
and 15.0%, 16.0%, 25.2% in 1996. See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 23
tbl.5.
In practice, progressive rates and multiple tax incentives work against
342
each other. See id. On one hand, progressive rates subject the wealthy to higher
marginal rates. See id. On the other hand, tax incentives tailored to the wealthy
lower their effective tax liability. See id.
See id. at 30.
343.
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a.
344.
345.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 30.
346.
See id.
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course and ensure that the taxing scheme becomes responsive to
the needs of the growing economy. Balcerowicz's proposal is a
radical step toward achieving these objectives. His plan has the
potential to be the rescue mission needed to save Poland's tax
system from collapse.
B. Will the System Overhaul Work Its Magic?
An Optimist's Perspective

Balcerowicz's proposal comes with a strong backing.
Economists in the United States have for years strenuously
argued the flat tax would benefit the American economy.34 7
Likewise, many European scholars have given careful
consideration to the feasibility of this option as a basis for tax and
social security systems in the European Union, concluding that it
could be the best way to proceed.3 4 8 Furthermore, the recent
success of Poland's neighbor, Estonia, whose economic growth
has been a steady 10% since the country switched to a flat tax
scheme,3 4 9 demonstrates that Balcerowicz's proposal is worthy of
careful consideration. The plan makes a good case for being the
solution to the problems that currently cripple the tax system.
For the reasons that follow, now is a great time for Poland to take
yet another chance on Balcerowicz.
1. The Major Benefits of the Reform
a. Benefits to the Economy
The most important benefit offered by the flat tax is its
stimulating effect upon Poland's economy. Improvement in the
performance of the economy will come as a consequence of two
fundamental changes: a radical reduction in the corporate
income tax rate from the current 36% to 22% by 2002, and a
comprehensive restructuring of the personal income tax scheme.
For nearly a decade, corporate taxpayers have argued that
the existing system puts too high a tax burden on business
income.3 5 0 Balcerowicz's promise to reduce the CIT rate by 14%
347. The two leading proponents of the movement, Professors Robert Hall
and Alvin Rabushka, recommend the flat tax as a cure that would bring "drastic
simplification" to the system. See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 21, at 53. They
promise "the economy would thrive under the improved incentives that the flat tax
would provide." Id.
348. See, e.g., A.B. ATKINSON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION: THE BASIC
INCOME/FLAT TAX PROPOSAL 154 (1995).
349. See Baczynski, supra note 29, at 20.
350. See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 50.
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over four years is an answer to those pleas beyond the taxpayer's
wildest expectations. 3 5 ' The change would put Poland alongside
its Eastern European economic rivals, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, as yet another investor friendly country.3 5 2 Indeed the
tax break, along with other changes in the corporate income tax
scheme, promises to procure a positive effect on capital
formation 3 5 3 Under Balcerowicz's plan, businesses would treat
4
and
purchases of equipment and buildings as expenses 35
immediate
for
an
allowance
the
proponents,
tax
flat
to
according
write-off of investment expenditures is "the ideal investment
3 SS

incentive."
The tax reform will likewise reward entrepreneurial efforts by
reducing the corporate tax rate. As it stands, the taxing scheme
promotes "confiscatory taxation of successful endeavors and the
tax subsidy for safe, non-entrepreneurial undertakings."3 5 6 The
latter effect is largely due to the interest deduction.3 5 7 The former
may be attributable to the high CIT rate and the practice of
double taxation.3 5 8 Balcerowicz's reform addresses this problem,
35 9
on the one hand, by doing away with the interest deduction
and on the other, by reducing the tax rate3 60 . As a consequence,
the draconian 36% corporate income tax rate will no longer
discourage investors from choosing a corporation as their incomemaking vehicle of choice. Flow of capital back into innovation
and development will ensure the formation of new businesses and
from these
the creation of new jobs. Contribution to the economy
361
emerging resources will be correspondingly high.

Commentators characterize the announcement as a "revelation." See,
351.
e.g., Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.
Corporate income tax rates in both Hungary and the Czech Republic
352.
are significantly lower than Poland's 36% rate. See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note
13, at 50. The two economies may be characterized as investor friendly since
lower rates encourage investment.
Because the Ministry's proposal is in most significant aspects
353.
indistinguishable from the model proposed in 1995 by professors Robert Hall and
See Hall &
Alvin Rabushka, their conclusions provide a helpful analogy.
Rabushka, supra note 21, at 47.
354. This is a consequence of eliminating most of the existing tax incentives.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 66.
355. Hall & Rabushka, supranote 21, at 46.
356. Id. at 47. The authors admit that scholarly studies are not available to
verify to what extent a fundamental shift away from this practice would generate
economic benefits, though they speculate that such benefits "could be large." Id.
See id.
357.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 49-51.
358.
359. This, according to the proposal would happen in the year 2000. See id.
at 69.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
360.
Hall and Rabushka estimated that if such reform were to be
361.

undertaken in the Unites States, it would generate a three percent increase in
output from "added capital formation and dramatically improved entrepreneurial
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The 14% reduction in the corporate tax rate closely correlates
with the anticipated changes in the scheme of personal income
taxation.3 6 2 Existence of an asymmetry between the corporate
and personal income tax rates would act as an incentive for an
artificial attribution of income to the entity subject to the lower
rate.363 Thus, the plan contemplates finally converging the two
rates as the last step in the reform.3 64 This will proceed in stages
to ensure that the diminishing revenues from the corporate
income tax will not seriously destabilize the budget, and that the
Ministry of Finance can compensate for the loss through
3 65
continuous increase in the value-added tax rates.
The second aspect of Balcerowicz's proposal-the reform of
the personal income tax scheme-offers additional benefits to the
Polish economy. Elimination of progressive rates is certain to
3 66
improve incentives to work by increasing after-tax wages.
Economists almost universally agree that most taxpayers would
3 67
respond to this added incentive by increasing their work effort.
A few workers may reduce their hours "either because the flat
rate would exceed their current marginal rate or because reform

would add so much to their incomes that they would feel that
earning was less urgent," but the "majority would face much
improved incentives" and respond accordingly.3 68 The increase in
taxpayers' work effort will, in the end, have a positive impact
3 69
upon the economy by raising the overall output.

This total output will likewise be affected by an increase in
the stock of human capital that will come as a result of the
reform.3 7 0 High tax rates have, for years, served as a disincentive

incentives." See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 21, at 48. (The authors also project
a three percent increase in output "from increased total work in the U.S.
economy").
362.
See discussion supraPart III.B.3.
363.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 63.
364.
See discussion supraPart III.B.3.
365.
For an overview of how the reform will be financed, see discussion infra
Part IV.B.2.
366.
See Hall & Rabushka, supranote 21, at 44.
367.
See id. at 45.
368. Id.
369.
See The Fairness of a Flat Tax: Hearings Before the House Ways and
Means Comm. (1995) (statement of Alan Reynolds, Director of Economic Research,
Hudson Institute) available in 1995 WL 339763.
By increasing the incentive to save, and to invest time and money in
education and training, a flat tax would enlarge the economy's stock of
capital and human capital, thus reducing the relative income shares of
those who are already endowed with such assets, while increasing real tax
receipts and enlarging national wealth in the process.
370.

See id. at 11.
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for people to invest their time and money in higher education.3 7 1
"Steeply rising marginal . . . rates have [had] a demoralizing

impact on those who might otherwise [invest in their training],
3 72
thus making capital and skills artificially scarce and valuable."
Balcerowicz's reform promises to undo this effect by eliminating
the progressive rates and lowering effective tax liability for 86.7%
of all individual taxpayers.3 73 Because the change in the stock of
human capital is directly proportional to the variation in the tax
rates,3 7 4 an increase in this type of capital will likely ensue. This,
in turn, will reduce the relative income share of the highly skilled
individuals 3 75 and cause a significant increase in revenues.376
Improved incentives for the highly educated will also limit the
emigration of such individuals,3 77 creating a competitive labor
force that is sure to profit Polish businesses and attract foreign
capital to Poland.
Poland's small businesses play a critical role in the country's
economic development. The fact that the flat tax offers numerous
benefits to this group of taxpayers is a powerful selling point of
Balcerowicz's plan.
Individual business owners themselves
appreciate the impact the flat tax would have on entrepreneurs
and small businesses by enhancing the benefits of working and
risk taking.3 78 "In terms of expanding the pool of available
capital, lowering and flattening income tax rates, and tax
simplification... small businesses will thrive under such
reforms."3 7 9 Symmetry between the corporate and personal
income taxes further ensures that decisions to incorporate such

Unskilled laborers ultimately suffer the consequences, as their
371.
productivity and, hence, their wages, are inherently connected with the economic

well being of the skilled workers. See id. at 10.

372.

Id. at 12.

373.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 65.

374.
Economists have argued that for every increase in tax rates, the stock
of human capital decreases proportionally with a much stronger effect if the rates
are progressive. See The Fairness of a Flat Tax: Hearings Before the Ways and
Means Comm., supranote 369, at 11 (statement of Alan Reynolds).
375.
Today, second and third bracket taxpayers (5.43% of all taxpayers) pay
33% of all personal income taxes. See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 30.
See The Fairness of a Flat Tax: Hearings Before the Ways and Means
376.
Comm., supranote 369, at 12.
377.
This is referred to as the so-called brain drain. See id. at 11. The
author notes further that "[t]alent may also be diverted from highly-taxed
productive activity toward underground activities or rent-seeking (lobbying for
government favors, such as import quotas)." Id.
378.
In the United States, small businesses are one of the most powerful
supporters of the flat tax. See, e.g., Impact of Flat Tax on Small Businesses:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Finance of the Comm. on Small
Business, U.S. House of Representatives (1995) (testimony of Raymond J. Keating,
Chief Economist, The Small Business Survival Committee) available in 1995 WL
306659.
379.
Id. at 5.
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businesses will only be marginally influenced by tax
considerations.
In effect, Balcerowicz's plan creates an
environment conducive to successful building and expansion of
business enterprises.
b. Other Benefits of the Plan
A particular vestige of the communist era has not allowed
many Poles to get a clear view of Balcerowicz's plan. Many of
them are uneasy about letting wealth be controlled by market
forces. They view fiscal regulation in the society as a method of
controlling relative economic positions between groups of
taxpayers and, to them, Balcerowicz's plan goes against that
objective by attempting to surrender such control to the free
market. 380 Yet, if they were to forego their fear momentarily, the
flat tax would suddenly gain in appeal.
Indeed, many
commentators agree that a flat tax is fundamentally fairer than a
progressive scheme, 3 8 ' because it is non-discriminatory, and it
extends the base to all taxpayers.3 8 2 It does not promote a
punitive effect on wealthier taxpayers, 38 3 nor does it favor any
sources of income over others. 3 8 4
Were Poland to adopt
Balcerowicz's proposal, the uniform tax law would finally put
farmers in the same category as other individual taxpayers. 38 5

380.
See Baczynski, supranote 29, at 20. The same taxpayers, when asked
whether they would like to see lower tax rates, elimination of tax incentives,

simplification of the tax system, elimination of the "gray area," and whether they
agree with the maxim that "one that works harder should earn more" in all cases
have answered in the affirmative. See id. This psychological barrier then, does
not seem to be insurmountable. See id.
381.
See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE JOINT ECON. COMM., 104TH CONG., FLAT TAX:
POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIc GROWTH (1995) available in 1995 WL 306606 ("The flat
tax, with its one low tax rate, would insure that all taxpayers pay their share. Tax
breaks for special interests would be eliminated. The flat tax would provide
fundamental fairness for all taxpayers.") [hereinafter SJEC Report]. But see, e.g.,
Flat Tax: Hearings Before the Senate Fin. Comm. (1995) available in 1995 WL
306766 (prepared statement of Professor Sheldon D. Pollack, Dept. of Accounting,
College of Business and Economics, University of Delaware) (describing the claim
that a flat tax is a "fairer" tax as "invariably put forth without argument or reason,
as if the proposition is another of those truths which we hold as self-evident.").
382.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13, at 62-63.
383.
See supranotes 341-44 and accompanying text.
384.
Balcerowicz's proposal contemplates passing a comprehensive statute
by the year 2002 that would regulate income tax liability of all taxpayers
regardless of the kind or the type of income they receive. See THE WHITE BOOK,
supra note 13, at 63.
385.
See Baczynski, supranote 29, at 20. The author suggests that putting
farmers in a separate category from the other individual taxpayers and subjecting
them to different tax treatment makes them de facto citizens of a different
category, and in that sense it is demeaning to them. See id.
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Furthermore, elimination of tax incentives would insure that all
income is treated equally.
Simplicity is the central feature of the proposed tax system.
The reform offers to reduce the high administrative costs that the
tax authority incurs year after year.3 86 Passing Balcerowicz's
simple tax laws would eliminate the need for countless rulings
and administrative decisions.3 8 7 Likewise, the cost of executing
the laws will decrease as the number of incidents of noncompliance will undoubtedly drop and the money thus saved may

be used to address the problem of Poland's gray-market or to
combat criminal tax evasion. From the taxpayer's standpoint, the
effort and cost of complying with the tax laws would likewise
drastically fall. 38 8 This dramatic drop in the cost of tax advice
would facilitate long-term financial planning, thereby increasing
the success rate among small enterprises. 38 9 Finally, a simple,
unambiguous tax system would bring greater confidence in the
government and an increased cooperation between the taxpayer
390
and the tax system.
The new tax system offers to significantly limit the output of
the gray market.3 9 1 The two most pervasive practices of the graymarket taxpayers-mischaracterization of an employee's status
and under-reporting of income 39 2 -may soon become too risky to
pursue. As a result of savings in administrative costs brought
about by the reform, the tax authority will allocate more
3 93
resources to fighting these and other forms of tax evasion.
Furthermore, the benefit of pursuing such activities will diminish
as a result of the reduction in tax rates and may no longer be
justifiable to the taxpayer under the new law. As a result, the
risk-versus-benefit analysis is likely to force many gray-market
taxpayers into compliance.
As a final consequence, Balcerowicz's plan promises to
eliminate politics from fiscal regulations. The continuous move
towards a more politically driven legislative process in the tax
area has had a significant negative impact on the law.3 9 4 The

386.

See id.

387.

See id.

388.
As an appendix to THE WHITE BOOK OF TAX, the Ministry included a
sample of a personal income tax form to be utilized under the new system. It
resembles the IRS form 1040EZ.
PIT-2000.

389.
390.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, app. Form

See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supranote 30, at 3.
"[Clomplex taxes diminish confidence in government, inviting a

breakdown in cooperation with the tax system and the spread of outright evasion."
Hall & Rabushka, supranote 21, at 29.
391.
See Baczynski, supranote 29, at 20.
392.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supranote 13 at 55-56.
393.

See Baczynski, supranote 29, at 20.

394.

See discussion supra Part IV.A.5.
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increase in the number of tax incentives during the 1993-1997
era is in large part attributable to pressure from the wealthy
interest groups. 39 5
Balcerowicz's plan offers to cure the
consequences of that legislative fiasco by eliminating all
exclusions and deductions from the tax scheme. 3 96 In place of
the old scheme, the Ministry offers a new system that promises to
equally represent all groups of taxpayers irrespective of their
political influence.
2. Why Now is the Time to Implement the Flat Tax
3 97
"Economic progress, in capitalist society, means turmoil."
In no situation is the truth of this maxim more manifest than
when a government undertakes to reform its tax system. It is one
endeavor in which almost every citizen has a significant stake in
the outcome, and none of them want to go through the battle
unheard. This political process is almost certain to complicate
even the most straightforward proposal. 3 98 It is then critical to
the success of the reform that the government chooses the right
way, and the right time to proceed with the undertaking.
Balcerowicz's introduction of the reform plan was highly
effective. The White Book of Tax was unveiled to the members of
the cabinet and the public only after the Ministry worked out the
details of the proposal behind closed doors. 3 9 9 While opponents
of the reform accused Balcerowicz of not subjecting aspects of the
proposal to public debate,4 0° he was by that time holding the final
numbers and speaking of the benefits that the entire reform
would bring to the taxpayers. He aimed to shift the public's focus
from the lost tax incentives and higher value-added taxes toward
lower effective rates for individual taxpayers, new jobs and gains
to Poland's economy. He advertised the proposal in the popular
media in the form accessible to the average taxpayer, 4 1 in an
attempt to draw support from the major beneficiaries. The
Ministry may have circumvented the political process and saved
itself from having to compromise on particular aspects of the
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See Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3.

396.

See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 62.

397.

DANIEL B. BAKER, POWER QUOTES 57
Schumpeter, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY).
398. See Hall & Rabushka, supranote 21, at 41.
399.

See Jacek

Mojkowski,

Fundament czy

(1992)

(quoting Joseph

klajster na fasadzie [A

Foundationor Putty on The Facade],POLITYKA, Sept. 12, 1998, at 16.
400.
See id. Balcerowicz conceded that nothing would have been more
disastrous to the reform than turmoil, demagogy and arguments based on
numbers taken out of context that would have resulted from subjecting single
aspects of the plan to public debate. See id.
401.
See, e.g., Baczynski & Mojkowski, supra note 30, at 3 (describing the
essence of Balcerowicz's proposal).
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proposed plan. If this approach proves as effective in practice as
it does in theory, the Ministry will proceed with the reform not
having "made concessions to the political pressures they may well
that
[have] force[d] the nation to accept an improved tax40system
2
qell] short of the ideal" that Balcerowicz had in mind.
The timing of Balcerowicz's proposal is likewise impeccable.
One of the challenges of reforming a tax system is honoring plans
and commitments made by taxpayers in reliance on the old tax
law. 40 3 Naturally, this reliance is a function of time; the older and
more stable the tax system, the more likely these taxpayers' plans
to
some
degree,
commitments
involve,
and
long-term
considerations based on the existing tax laws. On the other
hand, in a fluid tax system, taxpayers are less likely to consider
tax implications in making their financial decisions since the
consequences of their reliance would be uncertain. Because
Poland's tax system has undergone a constant stream of changes
and amendments in the last decade, 40 4 the number of taxpayers
who rely on the old scheme and who would be hurt by the reform
is presumably relatively small. 40 s To those few that did expect to
continue taking advantage of certain deductions, Balcerowicz's
40
proposal offers to temporarily preserve these incentives.
Poland must take advantage of this favorable circumstance
immediately, else there may never come a time when harmful
consequences of a tax reform would be so limited.
Yet another motive for immediately undertaking the reform is
the limited threat of political opposition from the Poland's middle
class.
Commentators have long been skeptical about the
possibility of a flat tax's success in the United States because of
40 7
By all
its adverse consequence to middle-class taxpayers.
accounts, a flat tax substantially shifts the tax burden from highincome to middle-income households. 4° 8 Indeed, Balcerowicz'
proposal concedes that for some 13% of taxpayers, their tax
burden would actually increase by an average of 0.6%.409
Included in that group are second bracket taxpayers, whose tax
liability would increase by some 1.3% under the flat tax

402.
Hall & Rabushka, supranote 21, at 41.
Depreciation and interest deductions are a significant source of such
403.
reliance and in order for the tax reform to remain fair and impartial it must
address the problem. See id.
404.
See discussion supraPart IV.A.
405.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 67.
See id.
406.
407.
See Charles E. McClure Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to
the Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 21, at
72.
See id.
408.
409.
See THE WHITE BOOK, supra note 13, at 65.
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scheme. 4 10 Indeed, were it not for the fact that the Polish middle
class is in its infancy (second bracket individuals constitute 4.4%
of all taxpayers), 4 1 1 Balcerowicz's plan would likely face strong
political opposition. By undertaking the reform today, its chances
of passing without having to make significant compromises along
the way are strong. As the middle class continues to grow, that
chance will gradually slip away.
After a decade of difficult transition to a free market
economy, not all individuals have been equally rewarded. Though
the economy has continuously strengthened, a large segment of
the population has not yet seen any significant improvement in
their standard of living. Lowering the tax burden for that group
of taxpayers 41 2 offers them a small reward for enduring the
painful transition at the time when they need it most. For many
of them, lower taxes may constitute the only meaningful evidence
that the economy is indeed doing well, and that the sacrifices they
have made in the last decade have been wholly justified. The
government would corroborate this evidence by not backing down
from the proposal. By pursuing the self-financing reform, it
would demonstrate, through action and not just on paper, its
absolute confidence in the strength of the economy. The power of
this message may never be stronger than on the tenth
anniversary of the commencement of Poland's journey toward
capitalism.
V. CONCLUSION

Ten years after Balcerowicz set Poland on course toward a
free market economy, he deserves our trust yet again. His flat tax
proposal promises numerous benefits to individual and corporate
taxpayers with significant reduction in tax rates for both groups.
It offers to further strengthen the economy--a consequence that
is especially significant in light of Poland's aspiration to join the
European Union. It contemplates a remedy for virtually every
ailment plaguing the current tax system, and most importantly,
the transition offers to finance itself. The time to set the reform in
motion is now. The proponents must appreciate the favorable
circumstances that exist today: lack of political opposition from
the middle class, limited harmful consequences to taxpayers, and
a positive message the reform will send. They must push for the
reform, confident that in the end, the flat tax will prove to be just

410.

See id. at 66 tbl. 19.

411.

See id. at 30.
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See discussion supra Part IV.B.i.a.
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